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Previous studies of the bureaucracy have focused on the internal relationship be-
tween politicians (principals) and bureaucrats (agents). External regulated actors, such
as firms, have generally been ignored. But firms strategically respond to their regula-
tory environment and regulatory uncertainty can deter investment. We examine how
concerns about firms’ strategic behavior affect the optimal internal organization of the
bureaucracy. When regulatory uncertainty is about how much firms will be regulated,
the ally principle applies: the principal delegates to an agent with similar preferences
as hers. When regulatory uncertainty is about whether firms will be regulated, the
ally principle fails to hold: the principal prefers an inefficient rule-based regulatory
framework or, if possible, to delegate to an agent with preferences distinct from hers
to encourage firm investment. We uncover novel endogenous limits to delegation since
the principal faces a commitment problem not to replace a biased agent after the firm
investment.
∗We thank Alexandra Cirone, Anthony Fowler, Sean Gailmard, Joshua Strayhorn, and conference partic-
ipants at MPSA, APSA, and SPSA. All remaining errors are the authors’ responsibility.
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1 Introduction
Policies yield no effect unless they are implemented, namely by ministries and agencies. Rec-
ognizing the influence of administrative rule-making, many papers have studied the internal
structure of the bureaucracy: the relationship between politicians (principals) and bureau-
crats (agents). In the presence of costless information acquisition, the primary finding from
this literature is the ally principle: a principal always wants to delegate and grant more
discretion to a better informed agents with similar preferences as her own (Krehbiel (1992),
Epstein and O’Halloran (1994), Gailmard (2002), Gailmard and Patty (2012b), Huber and
Shipan (2002), and Bendor and Meirowitz (2004)).1 But the effect of regulation does not
depend only on the decision of a bureaucratic agent – it is also affected by external actors’
strategic behavior, especially firms.
In this paper, we demonstrate that accounting for the strategic responses of firms to
the regulatory framework affects predictions about the optimal internal structure of the
bureaucracy and can lead to a reversal of the ally principle. This failure of the ally principle
occurs even though information acquisition is costless, all agents are equally competent, and
there is no incentive problems between the principal and the agent so the principal would
always want to delegate to a like-minded agent absent firms’ strategic responses.
To understand how firms’ strategic decisions shape the internal structure of the bureau-
cracy, it is important to analyze the effect of different regulatory frameworks on regulated
firms and the trade-off it entails for the principal. An important consideration for firms
is regulatory uncertainty which is often decried as a hindrance to private investment and
economic growth. Lloyd Blankfein, the CEO of Goldman Sachs addressed this issue when
discussing the domestic gas industry in a recent interview on CNBC:
We have to resolve some of the uncertainties [. . . ] Without stable regulation,
without an agreement and a compromise, an accommodation between the forces
that are focused on the environment and those that are focused on jobs and
1We discuss papers (e.g. Bendor and Meirowitz (2004),Gailmard and Patty (2012b) and Boehmke et al.
(2006)) which highlight conditions under which the ally principle fails in more details below.
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growth, we’ve managed to do a lot of production of energy. What we haven’t
done is gotten a lot of commitment to build the downstream plants that create
the manufacturing and the jobs
-Lloyd Blankfein, the chief executive of Goldman Sachs on CNBC, June 11, 2014
A rule-based regulatory framework establishes clear and unchanging standards and so can
resolve uncertainty and encourage investment. But rules do not adapt to circumstances and,
unlike a discretion-based regulatory framework, lead to ex-post inefficient regulation. When
deciding upon a regulatory framework, a principal who cares about the private (consumer
surplus and profit) and social (externality) impact of firm investment must balance this
trade-off between certainty and efficiency.
As we show, the principal’s choice depends critically on the nature of the regulatory
uncertainty. Firms face two forms of regulatory uncertainty: whether they will be regulated
and how much they will be regulated. When the first type of uncertainty prevails, compared to
discretion, the welfare-maximizing rule can significantly increase the likelihood of investment
by the firm: a rule then dominates discretion granted to an (unbiased) agent with similar
preferences as the principal’s – the ally principle no longer holds. Conversely, when the
regulatory uncertainty is how much the firm will be regulated, compared to discretion, the
welfare-maximizing rule decreases the likelihood of investment: Discretion then dominates
rules. In this circumstance, the ally principle holds.
In our model, regulation mitigates the effects of an externality associated with firm pro-
duction. However, regulation also increases the costs of production and thus reduces output,
firm profit, and consumer surplus. The cost of the externality depends on both the amount
produced and the degree of externality that is left unmitigated. As the degree of externality
increases, the principal wants more regulation. However, as regulation increases, she has less
and less incentives to further increase the level of regulation because the degree of external-
ity left unmitigated is small, quantities produced are low, and the high cost of production
generates low profit and consumer surplus. Consequently, as the degree of externality in-
creases, the regulatory cost imposed on the firm increases, but at a decreasing rate. The
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firm therefore always prefers a lottery over two strictly positive levels of regulation to the
average regulation level. That is, the firm profit under discretion is higher than under a rule.
When regulatory uncertainty is about the how much, not the whether, not only is discretion
ex-post efficient, but it is also more favorable to firm investment than a rule.
When the regulatory uncertainty faced by the firm is whether it will be regulated, dis-
cretion needs not dominate a rule. For a very low degree of externality, it is optimal for the
principal to impose no regulation since the loss in consumer surplus and profit associated
with any increase in regulation is always greater than the benefit of mitigation. The principal
is constrained by the inability of imposing negative level of regulation. In some sense, even
no regulation is “over-regulation.”
Under discretion, the principal cannot commit to compensate for over-regulation when
the degree of externality is low. In fact, when the degree of externality is high, she adapts
the level of regulation to the degree of externality. Under a rule, the principal can choose
an average level of regulation which takes into account the risk of over-regulation in the
low state. Consequently, regulation under the rule can be strictly lower than the average
regulation under discretion. The firm’s profit is then strictly higher under a rule which
increases the likelihood of the firm undertaking costly investment. As investment is socially
beneficial, the principal might choose a rule and its associated regulatory certainty over
discretion and its associated ex-post efficiency.
The reasoning above implies that even when a principal can delegate its decision to an
unbiased agent, she might refrain to do so to gain ex-ante commitment power. However, the
principal is always better off when she can delegate to an agent who is sufficiently biased in
favor of business (i.e., who weights the firm profit in his decision sufficiently more than the
principal). Such an agent chooses the same (zero) level of regulation as the principal when
the degree of externality is low. When the degree of externality is high, he under-regulates
compared to the principal. However, the level of regulation is closer to the principal’s ideal
level than the rule while still generating investment by the firm with high probability. Con-
sequently, delegating to a biased agent gives ex-ante commitment power to the principal
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while recovering some of the ex-post efficiency. and the principal is necessarily better off.
Our model thus predicts that more preference divergence between the principal and an agent
can lead to more discretion. Moreover, given the choice between an unbiased agent and a
pro-business agent, the principal always chooses the latter in these circumstances. The ally
principle is completely reversed.
Delegation to a biased agent, however, supposes that the principal can commit not to
replace the agent with someone whose preferences are closer to her own once the firm invest-
ment has been realized and the degree of externality has been revealed to all. As the expected
cost of investment increases, to encourage firm investment, the principal must delegate to
an increasingly biased agent. This agent chooses a level of regulation further away from the
principal’s ideal whenever the degree of externality is high. Even if replacing the agent is
costly, the commitment of not doing so then becomes more and more tenuous. Limits to
delegation thus naturally arise in our setting because agents have no information advantage
or expertise.
Our theory predicts that rules can dominate discretion and delegation to a pro-business
agent can dominate unbiased delegation whenever there exists an irreducible minimum level
of regulation. Constraints on the minimum level of regulation arise naturally in different
settings. First, these constraints can result from the nature of the regulatory instrument
(e.g., inability to affect firm behaviors when no regulation is imposed.) For example, laws
governing reporting or disclosure can do no less than require no disclosure or reporting. Nor
can safety and environmental regulation mandate that products become more dangerous or
that firms pollute more. Constraints may also arise due to the structure of the government.
State regulators are constrained by Federal regulation in the United States. Nation states are
also constrained by treaties or supra-national entities like the European Union (EU). These
higher levels of government impose minimum levels of regulation (e.g., the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts in the United States and Health and Safety at Work Framework Directive
in the EU) which increase the risk that no (additional) regulation is over-regulation.
5
The results of this paper show that the internal structure of the bureaucracy (the reg-
ulatory framework, the preferences of agents in charge of it) depends on the behavior of
regulated actors such as firms. Furthermore, depending on the nature of regulatory uncer-
tainty, different forms of internal structure might be optimal. Taking into account regulated
firms’ anticipated behavior does not lead to monolithic prediction: the internal structure of
bureaucracy and the regulated firms’ behavior are not easily addressed independently.
1.1 Literature
Our finding that delegation to biased agents can be optimal contrasts with the ally principle
at the core of much of the literature on the internal structure of the bureaucracy. This
literature focuses on the uncertainty faced by a principal and the optimal level of discretion
to grant to a better informed and possibly biased agent. Whenever possible, the principal
chooses “an ideological clone of one’s self as one’s agent” (Gailmard and Patty (2012b),
page 5). She also grants more discretion to an agent with similar preferences (Epstein and
O’Halloran (1994)], when uncertainty is high [Gailmard and Patty (2012a), Bendor et al.
(2001), Moe (2012)), or when she wants to encourage the acquisition of expertise [Gailmard
and Patty (2007)].
Several papers however highlight a variety of conditions under which the ally principle fails
to hold. Bendor and Meirowitz (2004) and Gailmard and Patty (2012b) show that the ally
principle fails when the principal needs to incentivize an agent to collect costly information
(see also Dewatripont and Tirole (1999)). In our setting, information about the state of the
world is costlessly acquired once a firm has invested, thus the failure of the ally principle in
our model originates from a wholly different channel unexplored in these models: the impact
of regulatory uncertainty, as determined by the regulatory framework, on firms’ behavior,
and vice versa.
Other papers document failure of the ally principle when firms are better informed than
bureaucrats. Boehmke et al. (2006) show that a principal might prefer to appoint ideological
distinct bureaucrats to screen better informed special interest groups and improve the effi-
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ciency of information transmission. Laffont and Tirole (1993) consider how regulators can
incentivize monopolies to reveal their private information through mechanisms that condi-
tion regulation on industry reports, and thus limit discretion. In a similar vein, Gailmard
and Patty (2012b) analyze the value of appointing agents favorable to business as a means
of extracting valuable information from a regulated industry. McCarty (2013) considers a
similar mechanism via self-regulation. Gordon and Hafer (2007) analyze how when they are
uncertain on the impact of regulation, politicians choose a regulatory framework to maxi-
mize firm’s contributions. Carpenter and Ting (2007) show that the regulatory stance and
the behavior of firms are self-reinforcing: more skeptical regulators lead to more provision of
information by regulated firms.2 In our paper, no actor has private information, nonetheless
the ally principle fails to hold because of the strategic responses of regulated actors to the
regulatory framework.
Our findings on the benefit of delegation to biased agents echo results in the central bank
literature that politicians can be better off appointing conservative central bankers who care
about inflation more than they do.3 Furthermore, as in our paper, this literature shows that
rule can lead to more socially beneficial outcome than delegation to a welfare-maximizing
central banker (Athey et al. (2005)). Our paper highlights that in a bureaucratic setting, the
nature of regulatory uncertainty plays a central role.
2 Model Set-up
In this section, we present a model which illustrates how the organization of the bureaucracy
depends on the strategic interactions between the principal, her bureaucratic agent, and
regulated firms.
2In a slightly different note, Gailmard and Patty (2013) show that a principal can use delegation in one
policy domain to incentivize truthful sharing of information in another policy domain. Since allies are more
willing to share information with the principal, the principal grants more discretion to an agent with distinct
preferences than hers. Notice that this partial failure of the ally principle arises again as a consequence of
asymmetries of information.
3It can also be related to the finding that patents are essential to generate investment in Research &
Development.
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A firm decides whether to enter a new market. Entry requires an irreversible, fixed
cost of investment, C ≥ 0. The cost of investment is initially unknown to all and becomes
observable only after the regulatory environment is in place. It is common knowledge that
C is distributed over the interval [C,C], with 0 ≤ C ≤ C, according to some cumulative
distribution function, F (.).4 If the firm does not enter, its profit is 0 so the firm enters the
market if and only if the expected profit conditional on entry exceeds the cost of investment
C. If the firm enters, it becomes a monopoly provider facing linear consumer demand:5
D = (1− κp) (1)
Where p denotes the price charged by the firm and the parameter κ determines the slope
of the demand curve. The firm profit also depends on the level of regulation R ∈ [0, 1] which
affects the costs of production of Q units of the good: c(Q;R) = Q
2
(1−R) .
6 The firm’s profit
function is:
Π(Q;R) = pQ− Q
2
(1−R) (2)
Production in the new market generates a per unit degree of externality, S, which takes
one of two values {S, S}. The realized degree of externality is unknown before the firm
investment, but is revealed to all players after investment is realized. It is common knowl-
edge that the level of externality is low (S = S) with probability q. Regulation imperfectly
addresses the externality. In addition to increasing the marginal cost of production, regula-
tion mitigates the externality proportionally: When the level of regulation is R, the cost of
externality is equal to (1−R)SQ.
The principal cares about consumer surplus (CS(Q;R)), the firm’s profit and the total
level of the externality. We parameterize the principal’s utility as a weighted sum:
4The main thrust of our argument still holds if costs are deterministic i.e. C = C
5We consider the case of multiple entrants in section 6.
6In an extension, we consider the case when a tax can be used as a regulatory instrument and show that
our main results hold in this setting.
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WP (R;S, αP ) = αPCS(Q;R) + (1− αP − γ)Π(Q;R)− γ(1−R)SQ (3)
The parameter αP corresponds to the principal’s bias in favor of consumers relative to
business. We fix γ ∈ (0, 1
2
) to focus the analysis on the degree of bias towards consumers or
business interests. Notice that that the principal is always weakly better off when the firm
invests.7
The principal chooses a regulatory framework which consists first of a decision to establish
a rule or to grant discretion to an agent (delegation). A rule is a fixed level of regulation
imposed prior to the firm’s investment and the realization of the degree of externality. Under
discretion, the agent chooses the level of regulation after the firm’s investment and can
condition it on the realized degree of the externality.
In addition, under discretion, the principal decides to whom she delegates. That is, the
principal chooses an agent with a different bias in favor of consumers (i.e., αA needs not be
equal to αP ). The utility function of the agent with bias αA is:
WA(R;S, αA) = αACS(Q;R) + (1− αA − γ)Π(Q;R)− γ(1−R)SQ (4)
We say that an agent is unbiased if the agent shares the same preference as the principal:
αA = αP . We call an agent pro-consumer if the agent weights consumer surplus more than
the principal: αA > αP . In turn, we call an agent pro-business if the agent weights the firm’s
profit more than the principal: αA < αP . To summarize, the timing is as follows:
7In section 6, we consider the case where the principal may prefer to forestall investment.
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1. Principal chooses between rule or granting discretion to an agent
If the principal chooses rule: If the principal grants discretion:
2. Principal chooses the level of regula-
tion Rr ∈ [0, 1], observed by all
3. The investment cost, C is realized
and the firm decides whether to enter
the new market.
4. If the firm enters the market, the ex-
ternality is realized
5. Payoffs are realized.
2. Principal chooses an agent with bias
αA, observed by all
3. The investment cost, C, is realized
and the firm decides whether to enter
the new market.
4. If the firm enters the market, the de-
gree externality S ∈ {S, S} is real-
ized and the agent sets the level of
regulation: Rd(S).
5. Payoffs are realized
For simplicity and clarity of exposition, we make the following assumption related to the
firm’s investment cost and the principal’s preferred rule. Let the unconstrained rule be the
level of regulation that the principal would impose ex-ante assuming (possibly naively) that
the firm always invests. We assume that under this unconstrained rule, the firm does in fact
always invest (i.e. C is sufficient low). The principal can thus choose her preferred rule,
which we denote the welfare-maximizing rule, without worrying about the firm investing or
not. In our extension section (Section 6), we discuss the robustness of our results to relaxing
this assumption.
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3 Rules versus Unbiased Discretion
In this section, we consider the problem of a principal deciding between a rule-based reg-
ulatory framework and delegation to an unbiased agent. It seems natural to assume that
the ally principle holds in this setting since there is no private information and no need to
incentivize information acquisition. Nonetheless, we show that there are situations where the
the ally principle fails: the principal prefers to establish a rule rather than to delegate to
an unbiased agent because a rule acts as a commitment device that resolves the regulatory
uncertainty faced by the firm and encourages investment.
We first show that for a given degree of externality, the level of regulation is unique. As
the level of regulation increases, an increasing share of the externality is mitigated. On the
other hand, increased regulation increases the cost of production which reduces the quantity








(b) Market equilibrium with regulation
Figure 1: Market equilibrium with different levels of regulation
The green area below P ∗(.) corresponds to the firm’s profit, the purple area above P ∗(.) to the Consumer
Surplus, the dark red area to the loss associated with a positive level of regulation (R = 0.5). Parameter
value: κ = 1.
The intent of regulation is to reduce the costs imposed by the externality. These costs
depend on both the quantity produced and the degree of the externality. Regulation affects
both of these components. Increased regulation has a direct effect by mitigating the cost
associated with a given degree of the externality. Regulation also has an indirect effect by
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increasing the firm’s marginal cost of production and reducing production. When the level
of regulation is low, a small proportion of the cost of externality is mitigated and production
is high. Consequently, there is a high benefit from increasing the level of regulation. In turn,
when the level of regulation is high, a high proportion of the cost of externality is already
mitigated and production is low. Consequently, there is a low benefit from increasing the level
of regulation. As such, fixing the degree of externality, as the level of regulation increases,
the marginal benefit of regulation decreases.8
Inversely, more regulation increases the firm’s (marginal) cost at an increasing rate. As
such, as the level of regulation increases, the marginal cost of regulation increases. The
combination of decreasing marginal benefits and increasing marginal costs implies that for
any degree of externality, there exists a unique optimal level of regulation. (See Lemma 1 in
Appendix A for a formal statement and proof).
There exists a positive correlation between the degree of externality and the level of
regulation. As the costs of regulation are unaffected by the degree of externality, the total
level of regulation is weakly increasing in the degree of the externality. However, for a low level
of externality the marginal benefit of regulation is extremely low, whereas the marginal costs
imposed by regulation are always bounded away from zero: regulation affects both the firm’s
profit and the consumer surplus through the higher price charged by the firm. Consequently,
no regulation is optimal for a low degree of externality: There exists a threshold Ŝ such that
whenever the degree of externality S is lower than this threshold, no regulation is optimal
(see Lemma 1). Otherwise, a strictly positive level of regulation, strictly increasing in the
degree of externality, is optimal.
The optimal level of regulation displays another interesting property with respect to the
degree of externality. Since regulation conveys decreasing marginal benefit and increasing
marginal cost, the optimal regulatory response associated with an increase in the degree
of externality is decreasing with the degree of externality. That is, whenever the level of
8As we show in Section 6 when we consider taxation as a regulatory instrument, the reduction in production
rather than the mitigation of externality is the main force driving this result.
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regulation is positive (equivalently, S > Ŝ), the optimal level of regulation is concave in the







Figure 2: Level of regulation as a function of the degree of externality
Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.3, γ = 0.4
Since regulation increases the firm production cost, the level of regulation is inversely
correlated with the firm profit. Consequently, for low degrees of externality (S ≤ Ŝ), the
firm profit is constant since there is no regulation. For high degrees of externality, the
firm profit is decreasing in the degree of externality. Since the level of regulation increases
at a decreasing rate with the degree of externality, the cost imposed on the firm increases
at a decreasing rate with S. That is, whenever the level of regulation is strictly positive
(equivalently, S > Ŝ), the firm profit is convex in the degree of externality as illustrated
Figure 3 (see also Lemma 4 in Appendix A). This convexity arises as a consequence of the








Figure 3: Firm profit as a function of the degree of externality
Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.3, γ = 0.4
The previous analysis characterized the optimal level of regulation for different degrees
of externality. However, the actual regulation faced by the firm depends on the regulatory
framework. Under rule, the level of regulation is based on the expectation of the degree
of externality. Under discretion, if the firm invests, the level of regulation depends on the
realized degree of externality (S or S). Thus, a rule is associated with regulatory certainty
for the firm, delegation is associated with ex-post efficiency for the principal.
However, the firm does not always value more regulatory certainty. As Figure 4 illustrates,
when the regulatory uncertainty is about how much the firm will be regulated (that is, the
level of regulation is always strictly positive: S ≥ Ŝ), the firm profit is higher under discretion
than under the welfare-maximizing rule. Under discretion, the firm faces a lottery over two
outcomes: The levels of regulation and associated profits when the degree of externality is
low (S) and high (S). Since the firm profit is convex in this range, the firm strictly prefers
this lottery over the certain level of regulation based on the expected level of externality
imposed by the rule.9
9Observe that the logic described above applies to any finite number of states as well as a continuous state
variable.
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Figure 4: Profit under different regulatory frameworks for high degrees of externality
Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.3, γ = 0.4, S = 0.25, S = 1.25, q = 0.5
In turn, when the optimal level of regulation in the low state (S = S) entails no regulation,
the firm’s profit can be strictly higher under rule. When the degree of externality is low,
the benefit of regulation is too low to justify the cost of imposing a strictly positive level of
regulation. Furthermore, the unconstrained optimal level of regulation is negative. Since this
is infeasible whether because negative regulation is impossible or there is a minimum level of
regulation imposed by higher level of government in a federal or supranational system, there
is “over-regulation” when the degree of externality is low.
Under discretion, the agent cannot commit to under-regulate in state S = S to compen-
sate for over-regulation in state S = S. She chooses a high level of regulation when S = S.
In contrast, under the rule, the principal balances over-regulation in the low state (S = S)
and under-regulation in the high state (S = S). The heightened cost of over-regulation in
the low state leads the principal to impose a very lenient rule. Consequently, the expected
level of regulation can be strictly lower and the firm’s expected profit strictly higher under
the rule than under discretion. Such a case is illustrated in Figure 5.10
10Notice that even if S < Ŝ, discretion leads to greater expected profit if the degree of externality in the
high state (S = S) is sufficiently large and the high state is sufficiently likely to occur (q is sufficiently large).
See Lemma 6 in Appendix A for details. The analysis of this case parallels the analysis of the case when
there is strictly positive regulation in both states and is excluded from the text for brevity.
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Figure 5: Profit under different regulatory frameworks for low degrees of externality
Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.3, γ = 0.4, S = 0.01, S = 0.525, q = 0.5
Having examined the relationship between the regulatory framework and the firm’s profit,
we now return to the principal’s decision to enact a rule or to delegate to an unbiased agent.
With delegation to an unbiased agent (discretion), the principal can achieve full ex-post
efficiency. When regulatory uncertainty is about how much the firm will be regulated, discre-
tion also leads to higher expected profit than the rule and the firm invests with probability
1 under both regulatory frameworks. Thus, the principal strictly prefers discretion—that
is, delegation to an unbiased agent—since it is ex-post efficient and encourages investment.
The ally principle holds in full when regulatory uncertainty is how much the firm will be
regulated.
The conclusion is very different when regulatory uncertainty is about whether the firm
will be regulated. In this environment, discretion leads to lower expected profit than a
rule. The principal then trades-off ex-post efficiency with a lower ex-ante probability of
investment. When it is very likely that the cost of investment is high, such that there is a lower
probability that the firm invests under discretion, the principal prefers the welfare-maximizing
rule even at the expense of ex-post efficient regulation because the rule gives the principal
ex-ante commitment power.11 (Proposition 1 in Appendix A formally establishes this result).
11By higher probability, we mean that there is sufficient probability mass on high investment costs. First
order stochastic dominance would satisfy such condition, but is stronger than required. See Proposition 1
for more details.
16
Consequently, the ally principle fails to hold in these circumstances. The principal wants to
reduce the discretion granted to an agent with similar preferences as her own.
4 Optimal Biased Delegation
In the previous section, we have assumed that the principal can only delegate to an unbiased
agent, that is an agent who shares her preferences. Now, we enrich the set of possible
delegates and show that given freedom to choose agents of any bias, a principal always does
better under discretion than under a rule. When regulatory uncertainty is whether the firm
will be regulated, the principal then finds it optimal to delegate to a pro-business agent: the
ally principle is reversed.
When the regulatory uncertainty is about how much the firm will be regulated, we know
that the ally principle holds and the principal will always prefer delegation to an unbiased
agent. This type of delegation has no effect on the probability of investment by the firm and
leads to ex-post efficient regulation for the principal.12
When regulatory uncertainty is about whether the firm will be regulated, the rule does
better than delegation to unbiased agent, but delegation to an appropriately chosen pro-
business agent is better than the rule for the principal. The pro-business agent weights the
profit of the firm in his utility function more than the principal. Therefore, for any degree of
externality the pro-business agent chooses a lower level of regulation than an unbiased agent.
As Figure 6 illustrates, this leads to greater profit for the firm.13
12This result also holds for the case described in footnote 10.
13See Lemma 5 in Appendix A for a formal proof. Notice however that for very large S, the level of
regulation in S is almost the same for an unbiased and a pro-business agent. In this case, biased delegation






















(b) Profit with pro-business agent
Figure 6: Market equilibrium with different levels of regulation
Dashed black line corresponds to the level of regulation and profit with an unbiased agent, the solid purple
line under a pro-business agent. Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.3, αA ≈ 0.067, γ = 0.4, S = 0.01, S =
0.525, q = 0.5
Suppose the principal chooses a pro-business agent such that the expected profit of the
firm under the pro-business agent is equal to the profit under the rule. This guarantees the
firm invests with probability 1. Furthermore, whenever the rule leads to strictly positive
level of regulation, the principal is strictly better off with biased delegation. In the low state
(S = S), she achieves her first best level of regulation and in the high state (S = S), the
level of regulation is lower than her first best, but strictly higher than the rule. Figure 7
illustrates this result, which is formally proven in Proposition 2 in Appendix A.14
14As we show in Proposition 2, the principal is always (i.e., for any cost of investment distribution) strictly
better off with biased delegation as long as S is not too high and the level of regulation under rule is strictly
positive. Furthermore, notice that choosing a pro-business agent who replicates the firm’s expected profit
under the welfare-maximizing rule always does better than the rule, but might not be the optimal strategy
for the principal.
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Figure 7: Discretion to a pro-business agent
Dashed lines correspond to the decision and profit with an unbiased agent, purple solid line to the decisions
and profit with a biased agent. Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.3, αA ≈ 0.067, γ = 0.4 S = 0.01, S =
0.525, q = 0.5
In these circumstances, the ally principle is reversed. The principal prefers to delegate
to a pro-business rather than an unbiased agent. By doing so, she gains some of the ex-ante
commitment power of the rule (increases the probability that the firm invests compared to
unbiased delegation) and recovers some of the ex-post efficiency of delegation to an unbiased
agent (given investment). Observe that the principal prefers a biased agent even though her
agent has neither special expertise nor an informational advantage over her.
5 Limits on Delegation to Biased Agent
In the previous section, we assume that every type of agents is available and the principal can
commit to retain the agent in all states. Focusing on the case when rule dominates unbiased
delegation (i.e., the regulatory uncertainty is whether the firm will be regulated), we discuss
how our results are affected when both assumptions are relaxed.
First, for delegation to dominate rule, it is necessary that the set of available agents,
denoted hereafter A, contains sufficiently diverse agents. If the available agents are all highly
pro-business, the principal might be better off with a rule. Delegation to a highly pro-business
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agent encourages investment.15 But it also implies that the level of regulation is always too
low in the high state (S = S). It can be so low that the loss induced by under-regulation
in the high state overweights the possible gain from encouraging investment and achieving a
level of regulation close to the principal’s ideal in the low state. This result corresponds to
the well-known cost associated with drift in delegation models (as such, it extends naturally
to the case when uncertainty is about how much the firm will be regulated).
Delegation might also be suboptimal compared to rules if the available agents are too
similar to the principal. If agents have almost the same preferences as the principal, the level
of regulation will be very similar and (for a set of distributions of investment cost) delegation
does not buy enough ex-ante commitment power to induce a sufficiently large increase in the
probability of investment. The principal then maintains an ex-post inefficient rule.
These results are illustrated in Figure 8 where agents with little bias in favor of business
only induce a small increase in the probability of investment. This leads to only a small
increase in the principal’s expected welfare who then still prefers the welfare-maximizing rule
to biased delegation. In contrast, agents too biased in favor of business guarantee investment,
but under-regulate too much in the high state from the principal’s perspective so she prefers
the ex-post inefficient welfare-maximizing rule. More policy divergence between the principal
and an agent can thus lead to more discretion, but the relationship is non-monotone.16
15In the previous section, we have shown that the principal is always better off when she delegates to a pro-
business agent who replicates the profit induced by the welfare-maximizing rule and thus leads to investment
with provability 1. Therefore, agents that are so pro-business that the principal prefers a rule must also lead
to firm investment with probability 1.
16In Appendix A, we provide simple conditions such that the principal does not delegate to agents too













Figure 8: Principal’s welfare as a function of agent’s bias
Dashed black line is the principal’s welfare under the welfare-maximizing rule. Solid purple line is for
discretion with agent with bias α. Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.55, γ = 0.4, S = 0.01, S = 0.24, q =
0.2, F (C) = (C − C)2/(C − C)2, C = 0.08, C = pi(Rule) ≈ 0.098
While a lack of appropriate agents may limit the appeal of delegation, another problem
lies in the principal’s inability to commit not to replace the agent. This problem arises when
the cost for the principal of replacing agents is low, while the cost of changing regulatory
frameworks is relatively high. For example, in the US, since the establishment of the Chevron
Doctrine, the operations of agencies are constrained by the intent of the law. As such,
moving from a rule-based regulatory framework to a discretion-based framework requires
legislative intervention. Conversely, the President’s authority to replace agency heads is well
documented and used (e.g., Lewis (2008), but see Gailmard and Patty (2012b), pages 236-7,
for a discussion of the limits to such authority.)
After delegating to an optimally pro-business agent, the principal never wants to replace
him once it is revealed that the degree of externality is low (S = S) since both prefer no
regulation. However, in the high state, the biased agent under-regulates from the principal’s
perspective. Since investment has already been undertaken when the externality is revealed
to all players, the principal has an incentive to replace the sitting bureaucrat with an agent
with preferences closer to her own. The commitment problem is especially acute when it
is very likely that the costs of investment are high, since the principal must delegate to a
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pro-business agent with preferences far away from her own to induce investment with high
probability. When the investment cost is likely to be high, the principal is then unable to
commit to retaining a pro-business agent whenever the cost of replacing the agent is low as
illustrated in Figure 9. Anticipating this, the firm does not find the principal’s commitment
to a pro-business agent credible and invests as if it was facing an unbiased agent. In such a
scenario, the welfare-maximizing rule dominates any form of delegation.
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Figure 9: Minimum replacement cost required to commit to sufficiently pro-business agent
as a function of C
Parameter values: κ = 1, αP = 0.55, γ = 0.4, S = 0.01, S = 0.24, q = 0.2, F (C) = (C −C)/(C −C), C =
0.085
In our setting, the principal delegates to a pro-business to encourage firm investment. A
biased agent has no informational or expertise advantage. Consequently, once investment is
realized, the principal cannot commit not to replace her agent when the degree of externality
is large and replacement costs are low. A then rule resolves both the ex-ante firm regulatory
uncertainty and the ex-post principal’s commitment problem. Despite the associated ex-post
inefficiency, a rule can dominate any form of discretion.17 This novel endogenous limit to
delegation arises due to firms’ strategic behavior. In fact, it is firms’ strategic response to
17Notice that since a rule solves both commitment problems, the principal might be better off if the cost of
changing the regulatory frameworks is sufficiently high (we prove this claim more formally in Appendix A).
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the regulatory framework which incentivizes a principal to delegate to an agent who differs
from her only in term of policy preferences in the first place.18
6 Extensions
In this section we present a series of extensions to demonstrate the robustness of our results.
We first show that a rule can dominate unbiased delegation when multiple firms can enter the
market. We then return to the case of a single potential entrant and relax the assumption that
the principal can always impose the unconstrained rule that maximizes her expected utility.
Third, we show that the ally principle also does not always hold when the principal seeks to
avoid a firm exiting a market or when the firm investment is welfare reducing. Finally, we
show that even when regulation takes the form of taxation, a rule can dominate delegation
to an unbiased agent.
6.1 Multiple firms
We consider the situation when at most N > 1 firms can enter the market. All firms face
a common fixed cost of entry and when L firms enter the market (L ≤ N), they engage in
Cournot (quantity) competition.19 As before, we assume that the welfare-maximizing rule
chosen by the principal guarantees that all firms enter the market.
As above, when choosing a level of regulation, an agent trades-off the mitigating effect
of regulation on the externality with the costs in term of firms’ profit and consumer surplus.
Since the trade-offs are similar as in the case of a monopolist, we find that there exists a
unique optimal level of regulation for each degree of externality (S) and that the level of
regulation is increasing and concave in S (Figure 10 and Lemmas 7 and 8).
The presence of multiple firms, however, has three important consequences. First, it
increases the total quantity produced. Second, it increases the consumer surplus (higher
18Naturally, such a commitment problem never arises when the regulatory uncertainty is about how much
the firm will be regulated. The principal can then delegate to an unbiased agent who always implements her
preferred policy.
19For more details on the entry process as well as all formal results and proofs, see Appendix B.
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quantity, lower price). Third, it decreases a firm’s and the industry (total) profit. These
three effects have important implications on the choice of a level of regulation. In fact, an
increase in quantity produced worsens the negative impact of any degree of externality. But
an increase in the level of regulation at first has little effect on the already low industry
profit. An agent who puts a lot of weight on profit relative to consumer surplus in his welfare
function chooses a level of regulation taking into consideration mostly the negative externality
associated with increased production. Inversely, by decreasing quantity and increasing price,
an increase in the level of regulation tends to have a strong negative effect on consumer
surplus. An agent who puts a lot of weight on consumer surplus in his welfare function
balances the mitigating effect of regulation with the cost for consumers. Consequently, a
pro-business agent can be more willing to impose a high level of regulation than a pro-
consumer agent since he faces a lower cost of doing so. As such, for low degree of externality,



















Figure 10: Optimal level of regulation with multiple firms
The plain black line corresponds to the optimal level of regulation for the principal, the purple dashed for a
pro-business agent, and the dotted red line for a pro-consumer agent. Parameter value: κ = 1, γ = 0.4,
αP = 0.3, pro-business agent: αA = 0.2, pro-consumer agent: αA = 0.54.
Also illustrated in Figure 10 is the fact that for a very low degree of externality, the
optimal level of regulation is still 0. In fact, as in the case of a monopoly, the agent in charge of
20Since regulation imposes a convex cost on firms, a pro-business agent always regulates less than a pro-
consumer agent for high enough degree of externality, see Figure 10a and Lemma 9.
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regulation would like to impose a negative level of regulation, but is otherwise constrained by
the regulatory instrument or by other jurisdictions (federal state, supranational agreement).21
Therefore, as long as the firm’s profit is decreasing with the level of regulation, the censoring
in the optimal level of regulation implies that, as for a monopoly, a rule can lead to higher
profit than delegation to an unbiased agent for low degrees of externality. This is the case in
Figure 11a (see also Lemma 11). As above, a rule can dominate unbiased delegation since it
guarantees entry of a greater number of firms (Proposition 4). Biased delegation dominates
both since it gives the principal much of the ex-ante commitment power of a rule while limiting
ex-post inefficiencies (Proposition 5). However, given that a pro-consumer agent tends to
regulate less than a pro-business agent for low degree of externality, the principal might
strictly prefer to delegate to a pro-consumer agent rather than a pro-business to increase the
likelihood of entry (Corollary 5).
Competition between entrants, however, also change how regulation affects firms’ profit.
By increasing the marginal cost, an increase in the level of regulation increases the equilibrium
price and total cost. While a single firm benefits fully from the increase in price, it only bears
a small portion of the cost increase: regulation deadens competitive pressures on profit.
Consequently, when the number of firms is large, profit increases with the level of regulation
for low level of regulation and hence low degree of externality. However, as the cost of
regulation is convex for firms, for high level of regulation, profit always decreases in the level
of regulation (high degree of externality). A firm’s profit thus exhibits an inverse U-shaped
relationship with respect to the degree of externality. But this implies that for intermediary
degrees of externality, the firm’s profit is always strictly lower under unbiased delegation than
under rule (Figure 11b). To gain ex-ante commitment power and incentivize firms entry, the
principal thus prefers a rule-based regulatory framework over unbiased delegation despite the
ex-post inefficiencies associated with it (Proposition 4).22
21By the reasoning above, this occurs whenever the agent puts sufficiently high weight on the consumer
surplus (see Corollary 4 for more details).
22Notice that unlike the case of a monopoly, a firm’s expected profit is higher under rule than unbiased
delegation when the level of regulation is strictly positive in both states (S and S). Delegating to a biased
agent always induces over- or under-regulation from the principal’s perspective. As such, biased delegation
does not necessarily limit ex-post inefficiencies and a rule-based regulatory framework can be optimal for
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(a) Three firms (b) Fifteen firms
Figure 11: A firm’s profit under different regulatory framework
Parameter value: κ = 1, γ = 0.4, αP = 0.3 q = 0.4, for Figure 11a: S = 0.01 and S = 0.5, for Figure 11b:
S = 0.2, S = 1.4.
Introducing competition between entrants does not alter our main results. As for a
monopoly, the principal prefers a rule-based regulatory framework to a discretion-based regu-
latory framework to gain ex-ante commitment power and incentivize firms entry. She strictly
prefers to delegate to a biased agent (sometimes pro-consumer) to solve her ex-ante com-
mitment power if biased delegation limits ex-post inefficiencies. Since the introduction of
competition only complicates the analysis, we return to the case of a single firm in what
follows.
6.2 Constrained rules and inherited rules
Returning to the case of a single firm, a rule can still dominate discretion when the welfare-
maximizing rule chosen by the principal does not induces investment with probability 1. In
this case, the principal trades-off her preferred level of regulation given investment against
the necessity of a sufficiently lenient level of regulation to guarantee investment with high
probability. The principal then chooses a constrained rule: That is, a (weakly) lower level
of regulation than the welfare-maximizing rule. The probability of investment under the
the principal. This suggests that rule-based regulatory frameworks might be optimal for very competitive
industries, while discretion to a biased agent might be optimal for industries exhibiting relatively low level
of competition. A full characterization of this result is left for future research.
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constrained rule is strictly higher than under unbiased delegation. Consequently, the logic
described above still applies and a rule dominates unbiased delegation under certain condi-
tions.
A similar logic explains why rules can be persistent even if not optimally suited to current
circumstances. For example, a principal might inherit a regulatory framework that is not
ideally suited to the current environment. If the inherited rule guarantees investment by
the firm with sufficiently high probability, then it can dominate unbiased delegation. If the
welfare loss relative to welfare-maximizing rule is small, then the principal may maintain the
inefficient rule whenever there are costs associated with regulatory change.
6.3 Avoiding exit
Our main results still hold when firms must decide whether to stay or exit a market. That
is, the firm must decide whether to continue to employ capital in an existing market or
allocate it to new activities which provide a profit ΠO > 0 (possibly revealed after the
regulatory framework is established). In this case, the principal seeks to avoid the firm
exiting the market. Her choice of a regulatory framework must take into account the firm’s
disinvestment decision. If the degree of externality changes over time and the nature of
regulatory uncertainty faced by the firm is about whether it will be regulated, the logic
outlined above indicates that the principal chooses a rule over unbiased regulation under
certain conditions.23
Firms might also choose to stay in the same market, but move production plants to
another jurisdiction. Our model then predicts that jurisdictional competition can not only
lead to deregulation (also known as ‘the race to the bottom’, Oates (1972)), but also can
induce the adoption of an ex-post inefficient regulatory framework.
23A similar result holds when the firm is uncertain whether it will face new regulation in a second dimension.
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6.4 Welfare-reducing investment
Rules can also dominate discretion when the principal ex-ante prefers the firm to allocate
resources to other sectors. This occurs when the principal gets higher expected utility from
investment in other sectors or when there is a fixed cost for the principal associated with
investment, such as the environmental cost associated with fracking or the systemic risk
induced by investment in risky derivatives.
When the principal wants to discourage investment, the principal may prefer a rule when
it reduces the firm’s expected profit so much that it does not invest. In contrast to the
previous results, the ally principle fails and the principal strictly prefers a rule when the
regulatory uncertainty is about how much the firm will be regulated (see Figure 4).
The principal can also choose to delegate to a sufficiently pro-consumer agent who always
regulates more than the principal (conditional on investment) and prevents the firm from
entering the market. In contrast to our previous results, the principal is never strictly better
off by delegating to a pro-consumer agent than by imposing a rule. In both cases, investment
is discouraged and the principal gets the utility from her outside option.
6.5 Other regulatory instrument
Another type of regulatory instrument available to the principal is taxation. Taxation im-
poses a linear cost on the firm. Nonetheless, we show that our results still hold in this setting.
The principal chooses either a per-unit tax t ∈ [0, 1] before investment (like a “rule”), denoted
tr, or to delegate to an agent the tax decision to be taken after investment (like discretion),
denoted td(S). The firm’s profit is now:
Π(Q; t) = pQ−Q2 − tQ (5)
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The consumer’s demand is the same as before (see equation (1)) and the utility of the principal
(P) and agent (A) is:
WJ(t;S, αJ) = αJCS(Q;R) + (1− αJ − γ)Π(Q; t)− γ(S − t)Q, J ∈ {A,P} (6)
As before, an increase in the tax rate is associated with a reduction in the cost of the
externality ((S− t)Q) on the one hand, and in consumer surplus and firm profit on the other
hand. As taxation increases, the firm produces less and the social cost of the externality be-
comes less important. As for direct regulation, the marginal benefit of taxation is decreasing
with the degree of externality: the optimal tax is concave in the degree of externality.
However, taxation has an additional effect compared to direct regulation. Taxation gen-
erates revenues for the principal which do not depend on the degree of externality. Conse-
quently, when the principal places little weight on consumer surplus and firm profit (γ high)
then for all levels of the externality, the principal implements a strictly positive tax.24 The
regulatory uncertainty faced by the firm is always how much it will be regulated and the ally
principle prevails.25
Censoring however occurs when the principal puts sufficient weight on the consumer
surplus and firm profit (γ is sufficiently low).26 In this case, there exists a strictly positive
level of externality, Ŝt such that the principal implements a strictly positive tax if and only
if S > Ŝt.27 The regulatory uncertainty is about whether it will be regulated. Consequently,
as in our previous setting, under certain conditions, the ally principle fails and is reversed:
rule dominates unbiased delegation and delegation to a pro-business agent is always optimal
for the principal when feasible.28
24In the original setting, as the degree of externality goes to zero, so does the marginal benefit of regulation,
therefore the level of regulation goes to zero for all γ.
25The notion of what constitutes an ally (unbiased agent) is stronger in this environment as the agent must
share the principal’s preferences over the use of tax revenue in addition to the principal’s relative weight on
consumer surplus and profit. This might explain why regulation by agencies rarely takes the form of a tax.
26Notice however that if γ is too low, the optimal taxation is always 0 since the principal does not put
enough weight on the loss due to the externality and gain from taxation (see Lemma 13 in Appendix B for
more details).
27Notice that a necessary condition for this result to hold is that the principal cannot subsidize the firm.
28See Propositions 6 and 7 in Appendix B for more details.
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7 Conclusion
Many papers characterize the optimal organization of the bureaucracy focusing on the in-
ternal problems inherent to delegation: the strategic relationship between politicians and
bureaucrats. A primary finding emerges from this literature: the ally principal. In this pa-
per, in contrast, we study how the strategic behavior of regulated firms shape bureaucratic
organization and the identity of bureaucrats. We show that the ally principle holds when
the nature of the regulatory uncertainty is how much the firm will be regulated. The prin-
cipal always wants to delegate to an unbiased agent since it maximizes the probability of
firm investment (ex-ante efficiency) and optimally adapts the level of regulation to the de-
gree of uncertainty (ex-post efficiency). But we also find that there are circumstances under
which the ally principal fails to hold and is even reversed. When regulatory uncertainty is
about whether the firm will be regulated, discretion to an unbiased agent can lead to too
little investment. The principal then prefers a rule-based regulatory framework to unbiased
delegation. She also chooses whenever possible to delegate to a pro-business agent.
We also identify a variety of limits on delegation that can also lead a principal to write a
rule rather than create a law with discretion. If the pool of possible agents is too similar or
too dissimilar to the principal, it may be impossible to achieve balanced biased delegation and
a rule might be optimal. Another limit on delegation unique to our setting emerges because
agents have no informational or expertise advantage. As such, once the firm investment
is realized and uncertainty is resolved, the principal also has incentives to replace a biased
agent with an unbiased bureaucrat. When the principal’s ex-post commitment problem is
stringent, the principal can do no better than imposing an ex-post inefficient rule. Our theory
then uncovers endogenous limits to delegation, which have not been previously emphasized.
An important consequence of our results is that the internal structure of the bureaucracy
does not depend only on the presence of uncertainty, but also on how firms strategically
respond to different regulatory frameworks. As such, the internal structure of bureaucracy
and the regulated actors’ behavior are not easily addressed independently.
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